Individual Fishing Quota (IFQ) programs allow fishermen to catch a percentage of the total quota for a species of fish or shellfish in a defined area within a specific time. This privilege allows fishermen to catch their quota anytime during a fishing season.

Advocates of IFQ programs offer them as the solution for many of the problems facing our fisheries, including over-exploitation, poor market prices, and unsafe conditions. Although IFQ programs can provide some of these benefits, many fishermen and conservationists are concerned that poorly developed and poorly regulated programs will undermine conservation efforts and economically harm fishermen and fishing communities.

Because of those concerns, Congress placed a four-year moratorium on new IFQ programs in 1996 and commissioned an exhaustive study of these programs by the National Research Council (NRC). In 1999, the NRC published a report called Sharing the Fish, which documented the benefits and risks of IFQ programs and identified a number of safeguards to assure that such systems advance conservation and do not disadvantage fishermen and fishing communities. In 2000, Congress extended the moratorium for two years so that national standards could be developed to address the risks of IFQ programs.

As documented by the NRC study and in additional peer-reviewed scientific studies, poorly regulated IFQ programs pose risks to marine ecosystems, family fishermen, and the public ownership of fish resources. IFQs can affect ecosystems by promoting "high grading," a process by which fishermen discard the low-value fish of the species for which they have quotas. In addition, IFQs provide little incentive to fish selectively or to protect ocean habitats from damaging fishing practices. Even worse, IFQs can impede efforts to adopt ecosystem-based management measures because quota shares are allocated for individual species and such allocations do not consider the needs of the ecosystem (for example, food for predator species).

Poorly regulated IFQ programs put family fishermen at risk because quota shares are often allocated based on the amount of fish a fisherman has caught in the past. This results in large-scale fishermen getting more quota and small fishermen receiving little or no quota and often being forced to leave the fishery. An IFQ can also be sold; it is "transferable," which favors large-scale fishermen or corporations who have the financial resources to buy large amounts of quota. If there are no caps on consolidation, corporate interests can gain control over large segments of the fishery.

While federal law states that IFQs are not compensable private property, many people fear that if the quotas are held for long periods of time (10 or more years) they will become de facto property. In fact, some banks have seized quota shares that have been used to secure loans. This may force the government to compensate fishermen for making changes to their quotas, such as reducing the size or number of quota shares.

To address these potential problems, Congress must adopt a broad set of national standards that will not prevent regional councils from enacting IFQ programs, but will provide protections for marine ecosystems, family fishermen, and the public trust. The "Fishing Quota Standards Act" provides those protections.